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Pollock: The Supreme Court Appeal of the Casey Martin Case: The Court's Tw

THE SUPREME COURT APPEAL OF THE CASEY
MARTIN CASE: THE COURT'S TWO OPTIONSMARTIN'S HOLE-IN-ONE OR OLINGER'S SLICE
INTO THE BUNKER

I. INTRODUCTION

A famous, yet trite, philosophical questions asks, "If a tree falls
in the forest and nobody hears it, did it make a sound?" Although
often over-used in the rhetorical circles to the point of annoyance,
this hypothetical clich6 is applicable in some contexts. For
instance, consider the predicament of Casey Martin. Martin is a
talented golfer who suffers from Klippel-Trenaunay-Webber
Syndrome (KTS), a rare disorder affecting circulation to his legs
which significantly impairs his mobility.' As a youth, Martin was
an excellent golfer, winning seventeen junior championships as an
amateur.2 At Stanford University with his collegiate teammates,
current professional golfers Tiger Woods and Notah Begay, Martin
helped to propel his team to the national championship in 1994. 3
Sympathetic to Martin's disability, the National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA), the United States' governing body
of collegiate athletics, allowed Martin the use of a golf cart4
enabling him to compete and complete an entire round of golf.
Without the use of a golf cart, Martin would have otherwise been
unable to walk the three or four mile length of a golf course due to
his disability. Had Martin not been allowed to use a golf cart as a
youth and during college, would the world have known how
talented a golfer he was? Would the thunderous sound of his club
have been heard outside the tree-lined rough of the golf course?

1 United States Department of Justice, Faces of the ADA (visited Sept. 21,
2000) <http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/frartin.htm>.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
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Like the tree in the forest, would his ability have made a sound or
would it just have gone unnoticed?
After college, Martin sought the opportunity to fulfill his dream
of becoming a professional golfer on the Professional Golf
Association Tour (PGA), the pinnacle of competition for the
world's professional golfers. 5 Unfortunately, the PGA was not as
receptive to Martin's disability as was the NCAA. The PGA Tour
refused to allow Martin the use of a golf cart, thereby denying him
the opportunity to fulfill his dream. 6 Due to the PGA's
inflexibility, Martin sued the PGA, alleging discrimination
violating the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),7 and
seeking modification of the PGA's rules to allow him the use of a
golf cart. The resulting lawsuit went to trial in an Oregon federal
district court in 1998.8 The district court found in favor of Martin
and ordered the PGA to allow
Martin's use of a golf cart in events
9
sponsored by the PGA Tour.
The PGA appealed the decision, and oral arguments before the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit occurred the following year.
This appellate opinion by the Ninth Circuit, Martin v. PGA Tour,
Inc., 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000) (hereafter "Martin"), is one of
the two subject opinions of this article. In Martin, the court of
appeals affirmed the district court's decision that Martin's use of a
golf cart was reasonable and that the PGA must allow Martin the
use of a cart in PGA-sponsored events.10 The Ninth Circuit issued
its opinion on March 6, 2000.
The following day, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
issued an opinion involving another professional golfer, Ford
5 Id.
6 United States Department of Justice, Faces of the ADA (visited Sept. 21,
2000) <http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/fmartin.htm>.
7 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
(2000).
8 Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1320 (D. Or 1998) (order granting
partial summary judgment) and 994 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Or. 1998). The first
opinion granted partial summary judgment to Martin, resolving the issue that the
PGA was subject to the ADA. The second decision was the district court's
actual dispositive opinion stating its holding in favor of Martin.
9 Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1253.
10 Martin, 204 F.3d at 1002.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/8
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Olinger, who experienced a similar obstacle in his attempt to
11
secure the use of a golf cart in a professional golf tournament.
That opinion, Olinger v. United States Golf Association, 205 F.3d
1001(7th Cir. 2000) (hereafter "Olinger"), the other subject
opinion of this article, held that the plaintiff, Olinger, did not have
the right to use a golf cart in the qualifying rounds of a
professional golf tournament. 12 In Olinger, the court of appeals
affirmed a district court decision, holding that Olinger's request to
use a golf cart was not required by the ADA.1 Olinger, like
Martin, has a disability which impairs his ability to walk an entire
golf course without significant pain and risk of further injury. In
14
this case, however, the United States Golf Association (USGA),
the administrating organization of the United States Open golf
tournament to which Olinger sought modified access (through the
use of a cart), was not required to allow Olinger's request.
Both Olinger and Martin were litigated under the ADA. Both
opinions raised similar issues including the reasonableness of the
plaintiffs accommodation, the fundamental nature of a golf
tournament, and the ability of the respective golf associations to
preserve the nature of such a tournament. In theory, both courts
used the same framework to reach its conclusion. The results,
however, are radically different. The Martin court held that the
ADA required the use of a golf cart to accommodate a disabled
professional golfer. At the other pole, the Olinger court held that
the use of a golf cart by a disabled professional golfer was not
required by the ADA. To borrow a metaphor from golf, both
courts used the same golf club to hit the same ball off the same tee,

11 Olinger v. United States Golf Association, 205 F.3d 1001, 1007 (7th Cir.

2000).
12 Id. at 1007.
13 Olinger v. United States Golf Association, 55 F. Supp.2d 926, 938 (N.D.

Ind. 1999).
14 The USGA is a separate, although not wholly unrelated, entity from the
PGA. The USGA administers amateur and professional golf tournaments and is
the administrative and regulatory body of golf in the United States. The PGA,
on the other hand, is the administrative body of professional golf which operates
several professional golf tours, including the PGA Tour, the LPGA Tour (a
professional tour for women), and the Senior PGA Tour.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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but one of the courts sliced the ball into a sand trap, while the other
hit a hole-in-one.
This case comment will explore the respective decisions and the
rationale of the two federal Courts of Appeal in the Martin and
Olinger opinions in light of the PGA's appeal of Martin to the
Supreme Court. Part I provides background information relating to
the purpose and the legislative history of the ADA, the controlling
legislation in the two subject opinions. Part II examines the
decisions and the rationales of the subject opinions, including both
the district court and court of appeals opinions in Martin and
Olinger. Part III analyzes several reasons illustrating why, in the
Martin appeal, the Supreme Court must affirm the Ninth Circuit's
opinion in Martin which correctly interpreted the ADA and must
overrule the Seventh Circuit's decision in Olinger which was
decided erroneously. Part IV concludes by discussing the impact
of any Supreme Court decision either narrowly, applying only to
professional golf, and more broadly, including the application of
the ADA to the realm of other professional sports.

II. BACKGROUND OF THE AMERICANS wiTH DISABILITIES ACT AND
THE FRAMEWORK FOR

ADA ANALYSIS

A. CongressionalFindings
Ten years have passed since Congress ratified the most
sweeping and effective legislation, arguably, since the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act. 15 The ADA was
ratified in 1990 as a result of a Congressional inquiry into the
problems faced by disabled individuals. 16 The Congressional
findings, included in the Act, illustrate the necessity of such
important legislation. Congress estimated that more than
43,000,000 Americans have at least one recognized physical or

15 See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 - 12213 (2000).

16 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2000).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/8
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mental disability affecting their lives, 17 a number sure to grow as
the Baby Boom generation ages into its golden years. These
affected individuals have historically experienced segregation and
isolation from mainstream society, resulting in invidious
discrimination. 18 This form of discrimination, deemed "a serious
and pervasive social problem," takes hold in vital areas such as
employment, housing, public accommodations, education,
transportation,
communication, recreation, voting rights, and
9
health care.'
The findings continued, stating that disabled individuals "are a
discrete and insular minority," 20 which is the same language used
to characterize African-Americans and other racial minorities in
the aforementioned Civil Rights Act. Based on "characteristics that
are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from
stereotypic [sic] assumptions not truly indicative of the individual
ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to,
society," 21 the discrimination against disabled Americans is
comparable, in some ways at least, to other discrete and insular
minorities who have received federal protection through remedial
federal legislation. Disabled individuals, "faced with restrictions
and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in
our society," 22 had no legal recourse at the federal level to address
their discrimination claims or to remedy their discrimination
claims,2 3 prior to the enactment of the ADA.

17 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2000).

18 Id.
19 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2)-(3) (2000).

20 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2000).
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 42 U.S.C. §12101(a)(4) (2000).
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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B. Purposesof the ADA
In conjunction with its nine preliminary findings, Congress
offered a four-pronged statement of purpose for the ADA.2 4
Congress presented the following purposes for the ADA:
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities; (2) to provide
clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards
addressing discrimination against individuals with
disabilities; (3) to ensure that the Federal
Government plays a central role in enforcing the
standards established in this chapter on behalf of
individuals with disabilities; and (4) to invoke the
sweep of congressional authority, including the
power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to
regulate commerce, in order to address the major
areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people
with disabilities.25
The ADA gave to Congress broad, remedial power--similar to
that given to Congress in enacting legislation addressing racial
discrimination--to address the nation's sad history of
26
In its findings, Congress found the stigma
discrimination.
attached to being a disabled individual similar to that of being a
racial minority, and as a result, it granted a similarly broad
legislative remedy. Many scholars and commentators, however,
have criticized the ADA as being too vague, too broad, and
unworkable, claiming that "Congress laid out the mandate [for the
ADA], but left the interpretation [of the Act] to the courts."27

24 42 U.S.C. §12101(b)(1)-(4) (2000).

25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Matthew Kensky, Casey Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc.: Introducing
Handicaps to Professional Golf by Widening the Scope of the ADA, 9 GEO.
MASON U. CIV. RTs. L. J. 151, 153, (1998).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/8
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The ADA defines the term, disability, with respect to a disabled
individual, in three ways: (1) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual; (2) a record of such impairment; or (3) being regarded
as having such an impairment.25 The Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR) offers insight and aid to fill in some of the gaps in the
Congressional definitions in the ADA. For example, the CFR
provides definitions for physical and mental impairment 29 and
major life activity, 30 and it notes several factors for determining
whether an
activity is substantial enough to be deemed a major life
31
activity.

C. Application of the ADA to PublicAccommodations
The ADA has three distinct sections or spheres of application.
Title I encompasses employment and provides protections against
employment disability-based discrimination. Title II offers equal
access to public services for disabled individuals. Title III of the
ADA prohibits discrimination against the disabled in public
accommodations. Title iII is the subject of both the Martin and
Olinger cases, despite the objections of the respective golf entities.
Keeping with its previously-noted characteristic of sweeping
broadly across many areas of coverage, the ADA includes a broad
and sweeping list of the examples of public accommodations
subject to the Act.32 The ADA includes many otherwise private
entities which are considered public accommodations when the
operation of that entity affects commerce. 33 The following entities
are examples of public accommodations, according to the Act:
(A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of
lodging, except for an establishment located within
28 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C) (2000).
29 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(1) (2000).
30 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(2) (2000).
31 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2) (2000).
32 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A)-(L) (2000).
33 Id.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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a building that contains not more than five rooms
for rent or hire and that is actually occupied by the
proprietor of such establishment as the residence of
such proprietor; (B) a restaurant, bar, or other
establishment serving food or drink; (C) a motion
picture house, theater, concert hall, or other place of
exhibition or entertainment; (D) an auditorium,
convention center, lecture hall, or other place of
public gathering; (E) a bakery, grocery store,
clothing store, store, shopping center, or other sales
or rental establishment; (F) a laundromat, drycleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel
service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas
station, office of an accountant or lawyer,
pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of a
health care provider, hospital, or other service
establishment; (G) a terminal, depot, or other
station used for specified public transportation; (H)
a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public
display or collection; (I) a park, zoo, amusement
park, or other place of recreation; (J) a nursery,
elementary,
secondary,
undergraduate,
or
postgraduate private school, or other place of
education; (K) a day care center, senior citizen
center, homeless shelter, food bank, adoption
agency, or other social service center establishment;
and (L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley,
golf course,
or other place of exercise or
34
recreation.
Although exhausting to read, this list is not exhaustive with
respect to listing all public accommodations subject to Title I.
The list, however, provides a rather comprehensive idea of what
types of entities are subject to Title III.
Title Ill's general rule prohibiting discrimination by public
accommodations is that "no individual shall be discriminated
34 Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/8
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against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of
the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of any place of public accommodation, by any
person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of
public accommodation." 35 This provision states simply that public
accommodations cannot discriminate against disabled individuals.
What qualifies as discrimination is another issue explained in Title
III. In the following section, the ADA answers that question with
this definition of discrimination:
A failure to make reasonable modifications in
policies, practices, or procedures, when such
modifications are necessary to afford such goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations to individuals with disabilities,
unless the entity can demonstrate that making such
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature
of such goods, services, facilities,
privileges,
36
accommodations.
or
advantages,
The two major areas of focus in this definition, and as will later
be seen in the cases at issue, are (1) whether or not a particular
requested modification is a reasonable modification of a public
accommodation and (2) whether or not that particular
modification, if reasonable, would fundamentally alter the nature
of that specific public accommodation. After a finding that Title III
of the ADA applies, meaning that the entity at issue is a public
accommodation, the determination of whether or not the public
accommodation has discriminated against the disabled individual
hinges on these two issues. If the accommodation is not
reasonable, then the public accommodation cannot be expected to
provide that modification to its disabled patrons because the Act
does not require unreasonable modifications to public
accommodations. However, if the modification is reasonable, the
public accommodation must make it, unless that particular
35 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2000).

36 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000).
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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modification would fundamentally alter the nature of the public
accommodation. As a result, if the modification would
fundamentally alter the public accommodation, the entity is not
required to make such a modification, similar to the scenario in
which a modification is not reasonable. The determination of what
exactly is reasonable or how a public accommodation can be
fundamentally altered is a difficult one which will be explored
fully in the conjunction with the cases at issue.
Ill. SUBJECT OPINIONS: MARTIN V. PGA TOUR, INC., 204 F.3d 994
(9TH CR. 2000) AND OLINGER V. UNITED STATES GOLF
AssoCIATION, 205 F.3d 1001 (7TH CIR. 2000)

A. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir.2000).

1. DistrictCourt Opinions: Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 984 F.
Supp. 1320 (D. Or. 1998) (ordergrantingpartialsummary
judgment) and 994 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Or. 1998) (dispositive
opinion).
The district court judge, both in the order and the opinion,
presented an illustrative background of Martin's condition and his
situation with respect to the effect of his disability on his golf
career. Martin is a professional golfer who suffers from KTS
which is a malformation of veins halting blood circulation from his
right leg to his heart and has eroded the bone in his right tibia,
causing significant atrophy in his right leg and substantially
limiting his ability to walk.37 Even the slightest touching of
Martin's right leg, which is only half the size of an average leg,
causes him extreme pain. 38 Martin's disorder has steadily
worsened throughout his life.39 The only way for Martin to relieve
the swelling is by elevating the leg, but even that simple activity is
37 Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1243-4.
38 Id. at 1243.
39 Id. at 1244.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/8
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painful for him. 40 Martin claims that each step he takes not only
places him at great risk for suffering either hemorrhages or blood
clots but also places him at significant risk of fracturing his
already-weakened
tibia with little likelihood of recovery from such
41
an occurrence.
After considering the testimony of several of Martin's expert
witnesses, the district court granted a preliminary injunction
requiring the PGA to allow Martin's use of a cart for the final
round of qualifying school. 42 Qualifying school is one of the ways
a golfer can gain access to PGA events and includes three stages
designed to filter out less-talented golfers at each stage.4 ' The third
and final stage narrows the competition to 168 golfers, after which
the top thirty-five advance to the PGA Tour and the next seventy
golfers qualify for44
the Nike Tour, a second-tier tour also sponsored
by the defendant. Because of his play in the third stage, the
plaintiff qualified for the Nike Tour. The district court extended
46
the injunction to cover the first two events on the Nike Tour.

a. PGA Tour Is not Exempt from Application of the ADA
At this point, the defendant moved for summary judgment, the
plaintiff made a cross-motion for partial summary judgment 47 and
the real essence of the trial began--a trial which attracted
widespread media attention mainly sympathizing with the plaintiff.
The first issue at trial was whether the ADA applied to the
defendant. 48 The defendant's major claim was that the PGA Tour
40 Id. at 1243-4.
41 Id. at 1243.
42 Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1322.

43 Id. at 1322.
44 Id. at 1321-2. The Nike Tour, also operated by the PGA, is a less
prestigious tour comprised of less skilled and experienced professionals than

those on the PGA Tour.
45 Id. at 1322.
46 Id.
47 Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1322.
48 Id. at 1323. See also Martin, 994 F. Supp at 1244.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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was exempt from the ADA because it is a private club. 4 9 The court
used a seven factor balancing test in order to determine whether
the PGA qualified for the private club exception. 50 In the order
granting partial summary judgment, the court weighed the seven
factors--genuine selectivity, membership control, history of
organization, use by nonmembers, club's purpose, advertising for
membership, and non-profit status--and held that PGA Tour was
not a bona
fide private club and did not benefit from that
51
exception.
After ruling that the defendant did not qualify for the private
club exemption, the court determined that the PGA was a public
accommodation subject to Title III of the ADA. 52 The court's
strongest argument asserted that a golf course is explicitly listed as
an example of a public accommodation in the statute. 53 The
defendant argued that its courses are public accommodations only
in the areas in which the public at large has access. Through its
"zones of application" argument, the PGA claimed that the area
outside the ropes, also known as the gallery, is a publicly
accessible area, while the area inside the ropes, the competitive
arena of the golf course, is not accessible to the public and not a
public accommodation. 54 The court rejected this argument for two
reasons. First, if this logic held true, the zones of application
would render meaningless the private club exception.55 Second,
the court held that neither the ADA nor the accompanying
regulations such as the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) support
such an argument. 56 A public accommodation cannot pick and
choose where it wishes to apply the law because the ADA applies
uniformly to all entities under its jurisdiction. A mixed use facility,
one which has portions zoned specifically for private use, qualifies
49 Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1323. See 42 U.S.C. § 12187 (2000) (Title III's
exception from ADA coverage for bona fide private clubs).
50 Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1324.
51 Id. at 1324-6.
52 Id. at 1326.
53 Id. at 1326. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(L) (2000).
54 Id. at 1326.
55 Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1326.
56 Id. at 1326.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/8
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as an exception to the ADA, but the defendant's golf course was
not a mixed use facility; the defendant merely wanted to "relegate
the ADA to hop-scotch areas" for its own benefit.57 The court cited
a recent case in Oregon regarding Portland's Rose Garden Arena
in which it held that the sports arena's executive suites, although
not open to the public, were subject to Title I1,58 and held the
defendant to the same standard.

b. The Use of a Golf CartIs a Reasonable Modification
After settling the issue of the applicability of the ADA to the
defendant, the court turned to the second issue, whether the
plaintiff s modification was reasonable. To provide insight into its
mindset about this issue, the court offered an analogy about a
disabled international traveler. 59 This hypothetical traveler wanted
to fly from Oregon to Germany. The first leg of the flight took him
from Oregon to Chicago, and he was accommodated on this leg.
On the international leg, however, the plane's captain decided that
it would provide no accommodation for his special needs and
refused to allow the disabled passenger on the flight. Although the
traditional adage held that the captain is in control of his ship, the
court asked whether the captain should have refused to allow the
passenger on the flight. Translated, the analogy asked the same
question: Should the PGA refuse to waive its rule, denying Martin
the opportunity to use a cart? In both cases, the rule has an obvious
purpose, and in the language of the PGA, is "substantive," but the
court stated a belief that even a substantive rule, such as allowing a
captain to control his airplane, must be modified to provide
reasonable accommodations for a disabled passenger in light of the
ADA.60
57 Id. at 1326-7.

58 Id. at 1327. See also Independent Living Resources v. Oregon Arenas
Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698, 758-9 (D. Or. 1997) (holding that many facilities
classified as public accommodations, such as banquet facilities, political
conventions, and private schools, are subject to ADA).
59 Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1247.
60 Id. at 1247.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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With this in mind, the court decided that the plaintiffs requested
modification was reasonable. 61 Defining discrimination, Title III
states, "No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of
disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the... facilities.. .of
any place of public accommodation, by any person who owns,
62
leases (or leases to), or operates a... public accommodation,"
and the plaintiff cannot claim full and equal enjoyment without the
use of a golf cart. In order to prevail in his claim, the plaintiff must
satisfy a three-pronged burden. The plaintiff must demonstrate (1)
that he actually has a disability, (2) that he has requested a
modification and (3) that the requested modification is reasonable
in the general sense. 63 Martin satisfied the burden of proving that
he has a disability. 64 His condition satisfied the ADA's standard as
a physical or mental impairment that limits one or more major life
activities, 65 because KTS is a physiological disorder qualifying as
67
a physical impairment, 6 6 and walking is a major life activity.
Martin's degenerative disorder is a permanent affliction of
constant duration and with a permanent impact which is exacty
the type of condition the ADA sought to classify as a disability.
The court stated that the second and third burdens of the plaintiff
were satisfied by the plaintiffs showing that the requested
modification was reasonable in the general sense. 69 The court then
held that the use of a golf cart in the game of golf, in the general
70
sense, is a reasonable accommodation to the plaintiffs disability.

61 Id. at 1248.
62 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2000).
63 Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1248. See also Johnson v. Gambrinus Co., 116
F.3d 1052, 1059 (5th Cir. 1997).
64 Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1248. See also Johnson, 116 F.3d at 1059.
65 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000).
66 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(1) (2000). See also Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1247.
67 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(2) (2000). See also Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1247.
68 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(2) (2000). See also Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1247.
69 Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1248. See also Johnson, 116 F.3d at 1059.
70 Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1248.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/8
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c. The Use of a Golf CartDoes Not FundamentallyAlter
the Nature of the PGA Tour
Under the framework specified by the court, after the plaintiff
had satisfied his burden, the burden shifted to the defendant to
prove that the plaintiffs requested modification would
fundamentally alter the nature of the defendant's public
accommodation.7 ' If the modification would fundamentally alter
the nature of the defendant's public accommodation, the defendant
would not be required to make the modification. 72 The argument
that Martin's accommodation would fundamentally alter the nature
of its tour was the defendant's primary claim. Citing precedent in
both the Fifth 73 and Ninth Circuits, 74 the court stated that the
determination of whether a fundamental alteration exists must
focus on the specifics of the disabled plaintiff s circumstances, not
on the generalized nature of the accommodation. 75 The defendant
claimed that an individualized assessment of Martin's case would
be inappropriate, but the court rejected this rationale, asserting that
such a fact-specific inquiry was not only appropriate but also
necessary for the purposes of determining this issue. 76 The
ultimate question in this case is whether allowing the plaintiff,
given his individual circumstances, the requested modification--the
use of a golf cart--would fundamentally alter the nature of the
PGA Tour. In other words, the court asked whether a modification
of the walking rule to allow the use of a cart fundamentally
alter
77
events.
Tour
in
played
being
game
the nature of the
The PGA cited the Rules of Golf ("Rules"), promulgated by the
United States Golf Association, a separate entity, in support of its
view that the use of a cart fundamentally alters the nature of the
PGA Tour. The body of the Rules contains no express prohibition
71 Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1249. See also Johnson, 116 F.3d at 1059; 42
U.S.C. § 12182 (b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000).
72 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000).
73 Johnson, 116 F.3d at 1059.

74 Crowder v. Kitagawa, 81 F.3d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 1996).
75 Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1249.
76 Id. at 1249.
77 Id. at 1249-50.
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of the use of carts. 78 The appendix, however, offers a provision
allowing revisions and/or additions of rules for certain
competitions governed by the PGA Tour. One of those revisions
designates that "players shall walk at all times during a stipulated
round unless permitted to ride by the PGA Rules
Committee," a
79
regulatory branch of the defendant's operation.
The defendant claimed that the purpose of the substantive rule is
to inject fatigue into the game of golf, further testing the skill of
the Tour's professional golfers. 80 Although it did not reject this
claim as irrational, the court deemed the fatigue factor to be
insignificant under normal circumstances. 81 One of the plaintiffs
experts stated that the calories expended during eighteen holes of
golf were nutritionally less than a Big Mac and that those calories,
expended over five hours, could be replaced easily during that time
while golfing. 82 Even the testimony of the defendant's prize
witness, former U.S. Open champion and television golf analyst,
Ken Venturi, about the fatigue factor during particularly hot and
humid weather conditions was deemed insignificant. 83 The court
held that Venturi's fatigue was caused by the weather conditions,
not by walking. 84 As a result, all golfers even those using a cart,
would have
experienced fatigue during those extreme weather
85
conditions.
Martin countered with the testimony of Eric Johnson, a fellow
Nike Tour golfer, who stated that walking did not create a problem
for him. 86 To Johnson, the act of walking did not add any pressures
or other negatives to his overall golf game. In fact, the court stated
a belief that most golfers would prefer to walk as opposed to using

78 Id. at 1249.
79 Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1249. (quoting PGA pamphlet, "Conditions of
Competitions and Local Rules" 6).
80 Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1250.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1250.
86 Id. at 1251.
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a cart. 8 7 If walking were so oppressive, why would a majority
prefer to walk?
The type of testimony elicited from the plaintiffs witnesses
elucidated Martin's claim that the use of a cart did not give him
any competitive advantage. The court accepted the testimony of
another of the plaintiffs experts who stated that so-called fatigue
due to low intensity exercise such as walking is a psychological,
not physical, phenomenon.8 8 The level of psychological stress
from the low-impact fatigue experienced by golfers who walk is
not nearly as high as the stress experienced daily by Martin due to
living with his disability. 89 Even with the aid of a cart, Martin still
must walk nearly one-quarter of a golf course, because of the
various obstacles on the course, subjecting himself to further
injury. 90 As a result of the testimony of the plaintiff and his
experts, the court determined that Martin experienced no
competitive advantage from the use of a cart.9 1 The court
concluded, "As plaintiffs [individual circumstances] easily
endures greater fatigue [purpose of Rule] than his able-bodied
competitors do by walking, it does not fundamentally alter the
nature of the PGA Tour to accommodate him with a cart... The
walking rule may be modified without fundamentally altering the
PGA's game .... "92 Because the plaintiff satisfied his burden of
proving that the ADA applied to the defendant's public
accommodation, that his requested modification was reasonable,
and that the requested modification did not fundamentally alter the
nature of the defendant's public accommodation, the court held
that the PGA discriminated against Martin and remedied the
situation with an injunction allowing Martin the right to use a cart
93
on the defendant's tours.

87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 1252.
90 Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1252.
91 Id..
92 Id.
93 Id.
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2. Court of Appeals Opinion

a. PGA Tour Is Not Exempt from Application of the ADA
The PGA appealed the district court's decision to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, and the case was decided nearly two
years later in March 2000. The court applied a de novo standard of
review, but in the process, it accepted many of the facts from the
District Court's opinion as well as from the trial record. 94 With
reference to the application of the ADA to the PGA, the court
stated simply, "There is nothing ambiguous about this provision
[of the ADA]; 95 golf courses are public accommodations."96 The
court once again held that the PGA's zone of application
argument, compartmentalizing the application of the ADA to
certain publicly-accessible areas, was inappropriate. The PGA's
claim that the restricted area, or the competition area, is not a place
of exercise or recreation within the meaning of the statute, was
also invalid, because even if the court accepted that argument, the
restricted area could be classified as a stadium or other place of
exhibition or entertainment within the statute, 97 making it a public
accommodation. 98 The court reiterated the district court's
argument from Independent Living, which held that a facility does
not lose its status as a public accommodation merely because entry
to that facility is limited. 99
The final reason cited by the court for applying the ADA to the
PGA Tour was the rejection of the defendant's claim that the
94 Martin, 204 F.3d at 997.
95 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(L) (2000) (listing golf courses as examples of public
accommodations).
96 Martin, 204 F.3d at 997.
97 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(C) (2000) (listing stadiums and other places of
recreation as public accommodations).
98 Martin, 204 F.3d at 997.
99 Martin, 204 F.3d at 997-8. See also Independent Living, 982 F. Supp. 698,
759 (D. Or. 1997); Menkowitz v. Pottstown Memorial Medical Center, 154 F.3d
113 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that Title Im applies not only to patients at a
hospital but also to staff of hospital).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/8
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selectivity of the tour precluded it from being a public
accommodation. 100 The PGA argued that because the tournaments
are restricted to the nation's best golfers and access to the public is
denied, the Tour is not a public accommodation.10 1 The court
swiftly rejected this theory. Competition is stiff at Harvard, Yale,
Northwestern, and the other top schools in the country, but this
kind of selectivity does not preclude those universities from being
subject to Title I1.102 The same type of competitiveness and
selectivity occurs on the Tour, and the results should be no
different as applied to the defendant. 10 3 The court's analogy of a
race exemplified its rationale. 10 4 If a track meet was classified as a
public accommodation at the outset, should it shed its status as a
public accommodation after narrowing down the field, heat after
heat, to the final race with the ten best competitors. The court felt
that answer was no for the hypothetical track meet just as the
answer was no for105the defendant, and it held that the ADA applied
to the PGA Tour.

b. The Use of a Golf CartIs a ReasonableModification
The court next addressed the issue of whether Martin's
suggested modification was reasonable. This area was one in
which the court deferred to the findings of the district court.
Because the district court held that the use of a golf cart was
reasonable in the sense that such use would help resolve the issue
of Martin's access to golf competitions, the higher court adopted
such a position.10 6 The court of appeals continued by once again
deferring to the district court's findings that the use of carts is
reasonable based on the fact that other competitions sponsored by

100
101
102
103

Martin, 204 F.3d at 998.
Id. at 998.
Id. at 998.
Id. at 999.

104 Id. at 999.
105 Martin, 204 F.3d at 999.
106 Id. at 999.
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the defendant such as the events on the Senior Tour107 permit the
use of carts, and that "it is not a difficult practical matter to permit
them [carts]. 1l 8 The court again relied on the district court's
finding that the use of a cart was also necessary for Martin based
upon the fact that Martin could walk the course neither on his own
nor with any artificial aids or prosthetic devices. 10 9 Because the
district court articulated the position that Martin's use of a cart was
wholly reasonable, the court of appeals held that the issue of
reasonableness was no longer in serious contention at the appellate
level. " 0

c. The Use of a Golf CartDoes Not FundamentallyAlter The
Nature of the PGA Tour
The court of appeals correctly identified the issue of whether or
not permitting Martin to use a cart would fundamentally alter the
nature of the public accommodation to be the most important issue
on appeal."' The court returned to the district court's finding that
the Rules of Golf,1 12 governing the generalized game of golf and
used by the defendant as a basis for regulating its tours, does not
explicitly require players to walk.' 13 The Senior Tour and the first
two stages of qualifying school for the PGA Tour do not require
golfers to walk.' 14 The defendant's counterargument was correct
when claiming that the PGA does not offer the generalized game
of golf, but instead offers a highly-specialized and particularized
107 The Senior Tour, also sponsored by the defendant, is a series of
tournaments, similar to the PGA and Nike Tours, for golfers over the age of 50.
108 Martin, 204 F.3d at 999.
109 Id. at 999. See also Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1249-50 (detailing the
artificial aids and prosthetic devices plaintiff attempted to use prior to seeking

use of carts).
110 Martin, 204 F. 3d at 999.

111 Id. at 999.
112 See USGA web site, 2000 Rules of Golf and Decisions on the Rules of
Golf, <http://www.usga.org/rules/rule_2000/index.html>

(visited October 25,

2000) (web site containing online version of the USGA's Rules of Gol]).
113 Martin, 204 F.3d at 999.

114 Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/8

20

Pollock: The Supreme Court Appeal of the Casey Martin Case: The Court's Tw

2000]

CA SEY MARTIN SUPREME COURTAPPEAL

411

brand of competition. 115 As a result, the defendant argues that tour
events are governed not only by the more generalized Rules of
Golf but also by the "Conditions of Competition" appendix
allowed by the Rules which permitted the PGA to modify the
Rules for particular Tour events. 116 One of those modifications is a
rule stipulating that all players in Tour events must walk, unless
permitted the use of a cart by the Tour's Rules Committee. 117 On
those events in which the Rules Committee has allowed such a
waiver of the walking rule, however, the Committee provided a
blanket waiver, meaning that all 11
competitors
were allowed to use
8
carts, not just specific individuals.
Just as it did at trial, the defendant claimed that an
individualized fact-specific analysis of the issue focusing only on
Martin's use of a cart was erroneous. The PGA utilized several
arguments in support of its position. First, as mentioned
previously, the defendant felt that its rule was substantive and that
any individualized analysis of a substantive rule was wholly
illegitimate. 19 The defendant conceded that some athletic rules
such as dress codes or uniform requirements could be modified for
the disabled, but it argued that competitive rules could never be
modified. 120 The PGA advanced a theory that the determinative
factor was whether or not the rule was substantive. 121 The PGA
distinguished substantive rules, ones that affect the play of the
game, from rules that are simply procedural. 122 If the rule was
substantive, as are competitive rules, it could never be subject to
exceptions accommodating disabilities. 123 The PGA believed that
substantive rules, like substantive rights in the legal arena, were
essential to the nature of competition. Any modification of an
essential and substantive rule would undoubtedly be a fundamental
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 999-1000.
118 Martin, 204 F.3d at 1000.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Martin, 204 F.3d at 1000.
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alteration of the nature of its program, which would go beyond the
ADA's compliance requirement. As a result, the PGA felt that
substantive rules were not required to be modified by the ADA,
and it drew the line in the sand at substantive rules. Because the
PGA felt that the walking rule was a substantive rule, it believed
that any amendment to the walking
requirement would
24
fundamentally alter the nature of the tour. 1
The court rejected the PGA's argument that substantive rules
automatically cause a fundamental alteration. This court stated that
although the defendant's argument had some merit, the defendant
apparently had not carefully read the statute.12 5 The ADA requires
modification unless it would fundamentally alter that nature of the
program. 126 The court felt that the PGA ignored the word,
fundamentally.127 The court stated that the PGA essentially
claimed that permitting a player to use a cart automatically altered
competition, and that the PGA arbitrarily classified this alteration,
and quite possibly every alteration to its interpretation of the game
of golf, as being fundamental. 128 Such an analysis defied the ADA
which provided an exception only for modifications that caused a
fundamental alteration, not just an ordinary alteration to a public
accommodation. 129 The court refused to allow the defendant to
make the assumption that all modifications of competitive or
substantive rules automatically resulted in fundamental alterations.
The court did not expressly deny the fact that modifications of
those substantive rules would alter the nature of the Tour, but it did
reject the logical leap 13to
assume that all modifications were
0
fundamental alterations.
After rejecting that argument, the court adopted the rule
followed by the district court and analyzed whether or not Martin's
individual use of a cart fundamentally altered the nature of the

124 Id. at 1001.
125 Id.
126 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000).
127 Martin, 204 F.3d at 1000-1.
128 Id. at 1001.
129 See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000).
130 Martin, 204 F. 3d at 1001.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/8

22

Pollock: The Supreme Court Appeal of the Casey Martin Case: The Court's Tw

2000]

CASEY MARTIN SUPREME COURTAPPEAL

413

PGA Tour.' 3 ' The court relied heavily on the district court's
opinion for this analysis. At trial, the defendant argued that the
purpose of the walking rule was to inject a fatigue factor into the
shot-making process, creating a more challenging game for
competitors. 132 The district court found that the fatigue factor was
primarily a psychological fatigue, rather than a physical fatigue,
and placed 3 much less emphasis on fatigue than did the
13
defendant.
The court of appeals, following the lead of the district court,
then evaluated whether Martin's use of a cart would give him a
competitive advantage, which in turn, would demonstrate whether
the defendant's purpose was actually significant and whether the
plaintiff's use of a cart would fundamentally alter the nature of the
Tour. 34 The district court gave credence to the PGA's stated
purpose, the fatigue factor, and the court of appeals held that such
a decision was not clearly erroneous. 135 The court of appeals,
however, found the PGA's rationale for the walking rule to be
erroneous and insignificant, following the district court's finding
that Martin received no competitive advantage from using a
cart.' 36 The court cited the facts that Martin must still walk more
than one-quarter of the course with a cart, and that Martin endures
significant pain and stress while walking, getting in the cart, and
getting out from the cart.1 37 The stress that the plaintiff endures
while golfing, even with a cart, is easily greater than the stress and
fatigue endured by an able-bodied golfer on the golf course
without the aid of a cart. 138 As a result, the court held that Martin
did not benefit from a competitive advantage, thus, eliminating the
defendant's rationale for its "substantive" walking rule. 139 The
131 See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1249. See also Johnson, 116 F.3d at 1059;
Crowder, 81 F.3d at 1486.
132 Martin, 204 F.3d at 1000. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1250.
133 Id.
134 Martin, 204 F.3d at 1000-1.

135 Id. at 1000.
136 Id.
137 Martin, 204 F.3d at 1000. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1251-2.

138 Id.
139 Martin, 204 F.3d at 1000.
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court added that because the plaintiff would not gain an advantage
in shot-making, leaving the central competition of golf unaffected,
Martin's use of a cart would not fundamentally alter the nature of
the PGA Tour. 14 0 The only effect that Martin's use of a cart had
would be that he could have access to competitions to which he
would otherwise have been denied access without
a cart--the
1 41
precise purpose of the ADA, according to the court.
Finally, the court rejected the defendant's slippery slope
arguments. The PGA claimed that by permitting such
individualized, highly fact-specific analyses, such as the one in
which the district court engaged, would open the door to a flood of
unintended applications. 142 For instance, the defendant claimed
that permitting Martin's use of a golf cart would lead to future
decisions requiring disabled runners or swimmers to be given a
head start in a race or requiring disabled basketball players to be
allowed to shoot three-point baskets at a distance closer to the
basket than non-disabled players, thereby making the shot easier
for the disabled athlete. 4 3 In the defendant's suggested scenarios,
the disabled athletes would be given a competitive advantage, but
in Martin's case, as the court had decided earlier, the plaintiff
would receive no competitive advantage. 144 The court of appeals
soundly dismissed the defendant's slippery slope claim, granting
that those hypothetical situations cited by the defendant would be
fundamental alterations,
unlike the Martin's use of a golf cart on
14 5
the PGA Tour.

140 Id.
141 Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)-(b) (2000) (Congressional findings and
purposes for ADA likely to be the basis for court's statement that opening the
doors of accessibility is the precise purpose of ADA).
142 Martin, 204 F.3d at 1001.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.
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B. Olinger v. UnitedStates GolfAssociation, 205 F.3d 1001
(7th Cir.2000)

1. District Court Opinion
The plaintiff in this case, like Martin in the other subject
opinion, suffers from a disability which renders him unable to play
1 46
an entire eighteen-hole golf course without the use of a golf cart.
Olinger, the plaintiff, suffers from bilateral avascular necrosis, a
disorder which has manifested itself primarily in his hips and
47
significantly impaired his ability to walk even short distances.
Olinger's condition had caused him to take medication, to control
pain and other symptoms, which has significant side effects such
as reduced lung capacity, making breathing more difficult-especially when active, dulling of his sensory perception, and
fatigue.' 48 Olinger has even been classified as legally disabled by
the Social Security Administration, although 149 the legal
classification by the SSA has no bearing on the ADA.
Olinger filed a lawsuit in district court, seeking the use of a golf
cart in the qualifying rounds and beyond, should he qualify, of the
United States Open golf tournament (hereafter "the Open")
operated by the defendant, the USGA. 5 ° The Open is the one of
the world's premier golf tournaments and is one of thirteen
tournaments operated by the defendant.' 51 The Open limits the
number of competitors to 156, limiting the field only to world's
elite golf professionals. 152 The USGA requires that entrants carry
either a certain handicap index if an amateur or professional status
in order to participate in a local qualifying round, the initial stage
of qualifying for the Open.153 As a professional golfer, the plaintiff
146 Olinger, 55 F. Supp.2d at 929.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Olinger, 55 F. Supp.2d at 928.
152 Id.
153 Id.
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has access to the local qualifying rounds. 154 The local qualifying
round consists of eighteen holes of golf on a single day, followed
by the next qualifying round, the sectional qualifying round of
thirty-six holes of golf. The top golfers at sectionals secure the
remaining spots at the Open
not already taken by professional
155
Tour.
PGA
the
from
golfers

a. The USGA Is Not Exempt from Application of the ADA
Olinger sought a court order from the district court requiring the
defendant to allow him to use a cart in the local qualifying round
of the 1999 Open. 156 The defendant offered several arguments as
to why the ADA was not applicable to either the USGA or to the
Open. The defendant first claimed that the Open is a not public
event, and thus not a public accommodation under Title IIl of the
ADA. 157 The court determined that it need not decide whether the
Open was a public event because the Open was not a public
accommodation with the meaning of the ADA.15 8 The ADA
prohibits discrimination "by any person who owns, leases (or
leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation."' 159 The
court stated that Congress intentionally chose to insert the word,
place, into the definition, and as a result the statute must be read to
mean that only places
can be considered public
16
0
accommodations.
The court held that neither the Open, a golf
154 Id. (noting also that plaintiff was one of more than 7000 competitors
accepted to compete in local qualifying rounds).
155 Id.
156 Olinger, 55 F. Supp.2d at 929. (The same court, the Northern District of
Indiana, previously granted him a temporary restraining order, allowing him to
use a cart in the 1998 qualifying round.).
157 Id. at 930.

158 Id.
159 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2000).
160 Olinger, 55 F. Supp.2d at 930-1. See also Welsh v. Boy Scouts of
America, 993 F.2d 1267, 1273 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that Congress could

have avoided the use of place in the definition of public accommodation in
ADA just like it did in Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but it
intentionally chose to insert the word).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/8
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tournament, nor the USGA, a golf association, was a public
accommodation because neither are places as specified by Title
1.61

The court stated that if the plaintiff were to succeed in its claim,
the ADA would need to apply to the USGA because it owns,
leases or operates a place of public accommodation. 62 The district
court held that the USGA did, however, operate a public
accommodation, over the defendant's objection. 63 Although the
ADA does not define operate, the court stated that the ADA's
language is extensive and applies to entities which operate a public
164
accommodation "even if the operation is only for a short time."'
During the local and sectional qualifying rounds each year, as well
as during the Open, the USGA operates 102 golf courses,
supervising play and other functions.' 65 These golf courses,
although some are private clubs, were considered public
accommodations. 66 The court determined that the USGA
exercised substantial control over the golf courses during
qualifying rounds and during the Open; as a result, the USGA
operated a public accommodation and was subject to Title Ir. 67
The defendant advanced another argument challenging the
court's finding that the ADA applied neither to the association nor
to the tournament, claiming that the area inside the ropes of a golf
course--the competitive area, as separate from the public viewing
area--is not a place of public accommodation because it is not
accessible to the public.' 68 The court rejected this claim based
161 Olinger, 55 F. Supp.2d at 931. See also Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1270-1
(rejecting the claim that membership organizations such as the Boy Scouts are
public accommodations within the statute).

162 Olinger, 55 F. Supp.2d at 931. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2000).
163 Olinger, 55 F. Supp.2d at 931.
164 Olinger, 55 F. Supp.2d at 931 (quoting 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B at 591
(1998)).
165 Olinger, 55 F. Supp.2d at 931.
166 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(L) (2000) (listing golf course as an explicit
example of a public accommodation).
167 Olinger, 55 F. Supp.2d at 931-2. See also Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1246
(rejecting the PGA's claim that it is exempt from the ADA and can set its own
rules).
168 Olinger, 55 F. Supp.2d at 932.
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upon the same reasons cited by the district court in Martin.169 The
court cited both the fact that many facilities classified as public
accommodations are restricted only to certain invitees 170 and the
ruling in Martin rejecting the claim that private facilities or mixed
use facilities can classify certain portions of that facility as private
enclaves not subject to the rules governing public
accommodations.17' This court analogized the USGA's operation
of public accommodations to the National Collegiate Athletic
Association's (NCAA) exercising control over public
accommodations, basketball facilities. 172 In a series of cases, 17 1 the
respective district courts found that the NCAA exercised
substantial control over the athletic facilities as places of exercise
74
and recreation, as well as places of exhibition and entertainment. 1
Just as the NCAA rejected the "inside the ropes" argument
whether the athletes were seen as performers or athletes, this
district court rejected the defendant's
claim that the area inside the
75
ropes was not subject to Title II.1

b. The Use of a Golf CartIs a Reasonable Modification
The next issue determined by the district court was whether the
plaintiffs requested modification was reasonable. Under the
court's specified framework, "the plaintiff bears the burden of
proving that the requested modification is reasonable in the general
sense.'' 176 In this case, Olinger's requested modification of the
169 Id.
170 See Independent Living, 982 F. Supp. at 759.
171 Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1326-7. See also 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B at 597

(1998).
172 Olinger,55 F. Supp.2d at 932.
173 See generallyBowers v. National CollegiateAthletic Ass'n, 9 F. Supp.2d
460 (D. N.J. 1998); Tatum v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 992 F. Supp.
1114 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
174 Olinger,55 F. Supp.2d at 932.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 934. See also Johnson, 116 F.3d at 1059; Martin, 994 F. Supp. at
1249 (holding that plaintiff must prove disability, request of modification and
reasonableness).
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walking to rule to allow the use of a golf cart is reasonable in the
general sense. 177 The court stated that the USGA did not state a
claim challenging the reasonableness of the plaintiffs requested
modification, and because the modification is178reasonable in the
general sense, the plaintiff satisfied his burden.

c. The Use of a Golf CartFundamentallyAlters the Nature
of the U.S. Open
Under the court's framework, once the plaintiff satisfies his
burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the
requested modification would fundamentally alter the nature of the
public accommodation. 179 Unlike the plaintiffs burden which
focuses on the reasonableness in general, the defendant must prove
that a fundamental alteration of the nature of the public
accommodation exists as a result of the plaintiffs requested
modification in light of the specific circumstances related only to
the plaintiff and his requested modification.' 80 The court stated
that the proper inquiry was "not whether the requested
modification would amount to a fundamental alteration of the
game of golf (plainly it would not), but rather whether the
requested modification would constitute 'a fundamental alteration
in the nature of a program,' . . . and the 'program' here at issue is
the U.S. Open.""' In other words, the determination was whether
Olinger's use of a cart in the Open would fundamentally alter the
nature of the Open.
The court determined that the plaintiffs use of a golf cart in the
Open would fundamentally alter the nature of the Open and based
its reasoning upon two arguments given by the defendant.182 First,
the court accepted the defendant's testimony that the use of a golf

177 Olinger, 55 F. Supp.2d at 934.
178 Id.
179 Id. See Johnson, 116 F.3d at 1059.
180 Id. at 932. See Johnson, 116 F.3d at 1059-60.
181 Id. at 934.
182 Olinger, 55 F. Supp.2d at 938.
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cart could give the plaintiff a competitive advantage over other
golfers at the Open. 183 The USGA claimed that the purpose of the
walking rule in the Open was due to the fact that the Open was
intended to serve as a test of stamina in addition to a test of shotmaking ability on the golf course. 184 The court relied on the
testimony of Venturi who claimed that the use of carts could affect
the lie, or the position, of the ball. i8 5 Venturi testified that the cart
could alter the condition of the grass on which the ball lies. 186 In
that case, a golfer who plays after a cart has come through the area
might be at a disadvantage. 187 Additionally, Venturi who won the
1964 Open in unseasonably and oppressively hot and humid
conditions, testified that a golfer who rides in a cart has a
competitive advantage for not having to exert the energy of
walking, especially in the conditions such as the 1964 Open.
The court agreed that the plaintiff made a valid point criticizing
the defendant's testimony about a competitive advantage. 189 First,
the defendant's testimony, about the competitive advantage for a
golfer who uses a cart over one who does not, failed to consider
the fact that Olinger is not an able-bodied golfer.' 90 The
defendant's studies did not contemplate the issue of whether an
able-bodied golfer, who walks free of the pain suffered by the
plaintiff, would actually be disadvantaged personally by the use of
a cart by the plaintiff, for whom the act of walking causes
fatigue. 191 However, the court still accepted the defendant's view,
holding that "a strong possibility exists that on any particular day,
such a competitive advantage might exist and that it might be
substantial."' 92 The court explicitly stated that it did not find "that
a golfer who rides in a cart invariably has a competitive advantage
183 Id. at 935-6.
184 Id. at 934.
185 Id. at 934-5.
186 Id. at 935.
187 Olinger, 55 F. Supp.2d at 935.
188 Id. at 935.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 936.
191 Id.
192 Olinger, 55 F. Supp.2d at 936.
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over a similar golfer who walks."' 93 However, it found only that a
competitive advantage might possibly exist, and that finding was
sufficient to rule that
the use of a cart fundamentally alters the
94
nature of the Open.'
The second basis on which the court held for the defendant was
that the potential impact of carts in the Open would fundamentally
alter the nature of the Open. This court stated that any court
evaluating the impact of a requested accommodation must
consider the potential impact on the nature of the activity or
program of the public accommodation. 195 According to this court,
the most alarming impact of a decision to allow the use of a cart
was that the decision would require that a competitor be given a
potential competitive advantage in a highly competitive activity
such as the Open. 196 This court did not want to require the USGA
to be forced to allow a golfer a competitive advantage in the Open,
an event which has traditionally
been highly competitive and
197
decided by one stroke or less.
Another impact of such a decision addressed by the court was to
consider who would be responsible for making the determination
of whether to allow the use of a cart. 198 The USGA raised the
question regarding what body would make the decision on whether
to allow the use of a cart. 199 Although the plaintiff's need to use a
cart was genuine, the court noted the fact that some golfers whose
20 0
need was not nearly as genuine might request the use of a cart.
The court was reluctant to impose the hardship of the added
responsibility and cost of developing a system to determine
whether or not future golfers need a cart or merely want to ride in
a cart.201

193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 937.
196 Id. at 937.
197 Olinger, 55 F. Supp.2d at 936-7.
198 Id. at 936.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 937.
201 Id.
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Finally, the court discussed the idea of the alternative of
allowing all competitors the opportunity to ride in a cart if they
desired. 02 The district court rejected that alternative because that
option would also fundamentally alter the nature of the Open by
removing the test of stamina from the competition. 20 3 Additionally,
such a decision would strip the USGA of discretion in governing
its own tournaments with respect to this matter, something that the
court did not wish to do. 204 The court noted that athletic
competitions should be treated differently than most ADA cases
involving a traditional workplace. 20 5 It held that the point of an
athletic competition was to determine who can perform an
assigned task better than all other competitors, in contrast to the
traditional employment situations in which the goal is to put all
qualified individuals on equal footing.2 06 The court stated that
competitions such as the Open are not about equal footing.2 07 It
asserted that the Open tests the stamina and skill of an individual
to strike a golf ball with certain accuracy under conditions with
more stress than normal situations. 208 According to the court and
the USGA, the use of a cart would remove some of the elements of
the test of stamina, whether one individual or all individuals are
given the opportunity to use a cart. 2 9 In that sense, the court held
that the use of a cart or other modifications in athletic competitions
would fundamentally alter the nature
of the activity of the public
210
accommodation, namely the Open.

202 Olinger, 55 F. Supp.2d at 937.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Olinger, 55 F. Supp.2d at 937.
208 Id. at 937-8.
209 Id. at 938.
210 Id.
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2. Court of Appeals Opinion: The Use of a Golf Cart
FundamentallyAlters the Nature of the U.S. Open
Although mentioning that the defendant raised some legitimate
objections to the district court's decision as to the issue of the
applicability of the ADA to the USGA and the Open, the court of
appeals stated that it hesitated to make a decision as to that factor
because the case could be more easily decided on the issue of
whether the use of a golf cart fundamentally alters the nature of the
Open. 21' Before making its determination of the fundamental
alteration issue, the court of appeals briefly mentioned the
plaintiffs major contentions on appeal.212 These contentions were
that the defendant failed to present any proof as to how the specific
and individualized circumstances of the plaintiffs use of a cart in
the Open would fundamentally alter the event and that the
defendant failed to offer any proof that the plaintiffs use of a cart
in the Open would impose any additional burdens on the
defendant. 213 These arguments were ignored throughout the
opinion after being mentioned by the court at that point.
The court delved into the fundamental alteration issue by
considering the origin of the issue in the Rehabilitation Act, 214 the
predecessor to the ADA, by revisiting a case 215 in which the
Supreme Court interpreted the statute. The Rehabilitation Act
bears much resemblance to the ADA,2 16 including language similar
to the reasonable modification and fundamental alteration
requirements. In Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442
U.S. 397 (1979) (hereafter "Davis"), the Court held that to lower
211 Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1005.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (2000).
215 Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
216 See Washington v. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 181 F.3d 840, 845
n.6 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting "We have held previously that the standards
applicable to one act are applicable to the other. Title II of the ADA was
modeled after § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act; the elements of claims under the
two provisions are nearly identical, and precedent under one statute typically
applies to the other.").
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or make substantial modifications of standards to accommodate a
disabled individual would be unreasonable and fundamentally alter
the nature of a program. 217 The Olinger court found Davis to be
enlightening, stating that in light of Davis, many courts, including
the one in Olinger, have held that "the ADA does not require
entities to change their basic nature, character, or purpose insofar
as that purpose is rational, rather than a pretext for
discrimination., 218 In addition, the Olinger court claimed that most
courts have held that an accommodation is unreasonable if it
imposes an undue financial and administrative burden on the
public accommodation. 219 In sum, a modification would
fundamentally alter the nature of a public accommodation if the
modification either (1) required the public accommodation to
lower its standards; (2) required the public accommodation to
change its basic nature, character, or purpose as long as the
purpose is not pretextual; or (3) imposed a financial and
administrative burden on the public accommodation.
The court of appeals deferred to the district court's findings that
the purpose of the walking rule was to test the golfers' stamina in
conjunction with the golfing competition and that the nature of the
Open would be fundamentally altered if the walking rule were
modified to allow the use of carts. 220 This court accepted the
district court's findings, stating that those findings were amply
supported by the record.221 In addition, the court offered two
additional reasons for holding that the use of a cart would
fundamentally alter the nature the Open.2 22 The first reason was
that the tradition of walking in the Open was essential to
competitive golf, and as a result, the elimination of the walking
requirement would fundamentally alter this essential concept, in
the process, fundamentally altering the nature of the Open. 22 3 The
court cited the testimony of Venturi and even of one of the
217 Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1005 (quoting Davis, 442 U.S. at 410).
218 Olinger,205 F.3d at 1005.
219 Id.at 1005-6.
220 Id. at 1006.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1006.
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plaintiffs own witnesses as claiming that physical endurance and
stamina are critical elements of the tournament. 224 Venturi's
testimony was extremely persuasive to the court of appeals.
Venturi testified that the conditions of the 1964 Open left him on
the verge of collapse, and that all players endured the conditions
on an equal footing. 225 In essence, he stated that "if any competitor
would have been riding in a cart, there would have been a
'tremendous advantage to the other player."' 2 26 The court also
cited Venturi's emphasis on "the importance and tradition of
walking
in 27 the
championship-level
tournament
golf
' '2
competition.
The court's second reason for holding that the use of a cart
fundamentally alters the nature of the Open was that a decision to
allow the use of carts would impose an additional burden on the
defendant. 228 It repeated the district court's finding that the
defendant would need to develop a system, at its own expense, to
determine whether a golfer desiring to use a cart truly needs the
use of a cart or merely wants to ride in a cart to compete. 229 The
court of appeals agreed that such a system would be an
unnecessary and undue burden, both administratively and
financially, on the defendant. 230 Such a finding was enough to
render it a fundamental alteration, in light of Davis.2 3 1 As a result
of these two reasons in addition to the district court's findings, the
court of appeals held that the USGA did not need to allow Olinger
the right to use a cart because the use of a cart would
fundamentally alter the nature of the Open.232

224 Id. at 1006-7.
225 Id. at 1006.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 1007.
228 Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1007.
229 Id. See also Olinger, 55 F. Supp.2d at 936-7.
230 Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1007.
231 Id. at 1005, 1007. (quoting Davis, 442 U.S. at 410).
232 Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1007.
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III. ANALYSIS
Because Martin and Olinger were decided on consecutive days
in different circuits of the Court of Appeals, the result was a split
in the circuits. Since March 7, 2000, the day of the Olinger
decision, no Court of Appeals has decided a case which, to use the
language at issue in this case, fundamentally alters the gridlock
caused by the two seemingly polar decisions. Neither the Seventh
nor the Ninth Circuit has reversed its decision in light of the other
circuit's opinion. As a result, Martin reflects the state of the law in
the Ninth Circuit, and Olinger represents the law in the Seventh
Circuit. Until recently, nothing has been done to alter this status.
On September 26, 2000, however, the Supreme Court finally
weighed into the controversy. On that date, the Court granted the
PGA's writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit and agreed to hear the case.2 33 By agreeing to
hear the Martin appeal, the Court will likely attempt to resolve
both the narrow issue of whether Martin can continue to use a cart
on the PGA Tour and the broader issue of whether the use of a cart
should be allowed in professional golf, addressing the split
between the Seventh and Ninth Circuits caused by the Olinger and
234
Martin decisions, respectively.
Should the Court address the split between the circuits in its
appeal, the Court must decide which decision, Martin or Olinger,
best reflects the state of the law. This appeal will be yet another
instance in which the Court must interpret and apply the ADA.
The Court should decide that both the language of the ADA and
the case law interpreting it suggests that the use of a golf cart in
either a professional golf tournament or a tour comprised of a
series of tournaments is a reasonable modification under the ADA
233 Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. granted,
2000 U.S. LEXIS 4865, 147 L. Ed. 2d 1052, 69 U.S.L.W. 3223 (U.S. Sept. 26,
2000) (No. 00-24).
234 The date for a final resolution for Martin (and indirectly for Olinger
should the Court address the split between circuits as noted above) is unknown.
The PGA's briefs will be filed November 13, 2000, and Martin's brief must be
filed by December 13. Any reply briefs are due December 29. Any final
disposition will likely occur late in the winter or early spring 2001.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/8
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which does not fundamentally alter the nature of the competitive
golf tournament. As a result, the Court should find that the Ninth
Circuit's Martin decision most accurately reflects the state of the
law on this issue and that the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Olinger
was decided incorrectly.
In making its decision, the Court must consider the same issues
addressed in the ADA analysis of both the Martin -and Olinger
courts. Both courts focused on three main issues in their opinions:
(1) Whether the respective golf entity (PGA or USGA) is a public
accommodation, triggering application of the ADA, (2) whether
the respective plaintiffs requested modification, the use of a golf
cart, is reasonable, and (3) whether the use of a golf cart
fundamentally alters the nature of the program at issue in the
public accommodation (the PGA Tour or the Open, respectively).
On appeal, the Court need not consider either the first or second
issue but must focus its attention only on the issue of whether the
use of a cart fundamentally alters the PGA Tour. Even in Olinger,
which held that the use of a cart fundamentally altered the nature
of the Open, the Seventh Circuit addressed only the third issue,
assuming arguendo
that the first two issues were resolved in favor
235
of the plaintiff.
In resolving the issue of whether the use of a golf cart
fundamentally alters the nature of the PGA Tour, the Court should
find the Ninth Circuit's analysis in the Martin opinion to be more
persuasive because Martin more accurately interprets the ADA
and reflects the current state of the law. One of the speculative
reasons that the Seventh Circuit likely rejected Olinger's claim
was due to the fact that the Seventh Circuit is more conservative
than the more judicially-activist Ninth Circuit which decided
Martin. Neither the state of Indiana nor its representatives on the
court would generally be prone to such activism by the court. As a
result, the district court in Indiana and the Seventh Circuit would
be more likely to accept the USGA's argument based on tradition.
An argument based on tradition, not on the alteration of longstanding rules, is the benchmark of judicial conservatism. Such a
decision would be expected by the two courts deciding Olinger's
235 Olinger,205 F.3d at 1005.
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case. In addition, another speculative reason for the decision in
Olinger might be due to the differences between the two
organizations, the PGA and the USGA. The argument could be
made that because the golfers on the PGA Tour are all
professionals, those golfers are all at such a tremendously high
skill level that a variable such as the introduction of a golf cart
would not affect the competition in any fundamental way.
Following that logic, because the Open, for instance, invites both
amateurs and professionals to compete for the United States golf
championship, the skill levels of all participants might not be as
uniform as on the PGA, meaning that the introduction of a cart
might affect the competitiveness of the tournament. Such a
difference was not noted by either deciding court in Olinger and is
only speculative.
In a less speculative analysis of the Martin and Olinger
opinions, several factors illustrate the fallacy of the Olinger
decision. These five factors are illustrative of the erroneous nature
of the opinion by the Olinger court and demonstrate the precise
reasons why the Supreme Court must affirm the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Martin and overrule the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Olinger. The Olinger court erroneously relied on four irrelevant or
irrational factors in arriving at its decision: (1) Certain irrelevant
age and eligibility rules promulgated by state high school
regulatory associations discussed in several Court of Appeals
opinions, (2) the irrelevant undue burden or undue hardship
exemption, (3) the irrelevant competitive advantage estimation,
and (4) the irrational use of tradition. In addition, the Olinger court
failed to follow the framework for ADA analysis utilized in the
precedent of its own Seventh Circuit opinions and in decisions by
the Fifth and Ninth Circuits which mandated the weighing of
evidence focusing on the specifics of the plaintiffs circumstances.
The Olinger court's misapplication and/or lack of consideration of
these five factors illustrates the inaccuracy of the Olinger decision
and mandates that the Supreme Court affirm the Martin decision
and overrule Olinger.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/8
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A. Olinger's Reliance on High School Age Limit Cases Was
Erroneous
In the Olinger decision, the USGA referred to several opinions
from the Sixth 2 36 and Eighth Circuits2 37 which examined age and
eligibility rules for high school athletes promulgated by several
state high school athletic commissions. The Olinger court cited
these high school cases, stating that courts have held that the ADA
does not mandate that an entity change its basic nature, character,
or purpose provided that the stated purpose is rational and not a
pretext for discrimination 2 38 The court in Olinger used this point
to claim that the ADA did not require the USGA to waive the no
cart rule because the rule's purpose, to inject fatigue into the
239
competition, was rational and not a pretext for discrimination.
The court inferred that any alteration to the USGA's rational rule
would change the basic nature, character, or purpose of the no cart
rule, and as a result, that revision of the rule would be a
fundamental alteration, the type not required by the ADA.24 °
A brief look at the high school cases cited by the USGA will
demonstrate that the USGA's reliance on these cases was
misplaced. In these cases, the Sixth and Eighth Circuits examined
"interscholastic age eligibility rules imposed by athletic
associations of student-athletes and potential student-athletes
[which] limit[ed] athletic competition to those under 19 years of
age.,2 4 1 The courts in these cases determined whether to allow
modification of age limitations for disabled students under the
ADA. In Pottgen v. Missouri State High Sch. Activities Ass "n,
40
236 See Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026 (6th

Cir. 1995).
237 See Pottgen v. Missouri State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d 926
(8th Cir. 1994).
238 Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1005.
239 Id. at 1005-6.
240 Id. at. 1006.
241 Diane Heckman, Athletic Associations and Disabled Student-Athletes in
the 1990's, 143 WEST'S EDUC. L. REP. 1, 23 (2000).
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F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1994) (hereafter "Pottgen"), the Eighth Circuit
examined the issue of whether to waive the age limit for a
nineteen-year-old student-athlete with a learning disability.242 The
court upheld the age limit stating the rule was a rational one which
"helps reduce the competitive advantage flowing to teams using
older athletes; protects younger athletes. . . discourages student
athletes from delaying their education. . .and prevents .. .redshirting to gain a competitive advantage. These purposes are of
immense importance. ' ' 243 The court added that waiving the rule
was a fundamental alteration of interscholastic athletics and that
the student's request was not a reasonable modification of the rule
because no reasonable alternative, other than waiving the rule, was
possible to remedy the situation. 244 In Sandison v. Michigan High
Sch. Aihletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995) (hereafter
"Sandison") from the Sixth Circuit, the court denied waiving a
similar age limit for two nineteen-year-old athletes with learning
disabilities. 245 The Sandison court upheld the age limit for some of
the same reasons as the Pottgen court, claiming that the rule
protected younger athletes and was rational. The court held that
waiving the rule would be a fundamental alteration to high school
athletics.246
These cases are distinguishable from the situation in Olinger.
Obviously, Olinger is not an eligibility case, unlike the student
athletes whose eligibility to participate in interscholastic athletics
was denied. Olinger was eligible to play in qualifying rounds for
the Open based on his ability to hit a golf ball, not on his ability to
walk eighteen holes, unlike the student athletes whose access to
participate in interscholastic athletics was totally denied because of
their age.247 Eligibility has no part to play in these cases, and any
claim advanced by the USGA based on that rationale has not a
legal leg on which stand.
242 Id. at 29.
243 Pottgen, 40 F.3d at 929.
244 Id. at 929.
245 Heckman, supranote 241, at 27.
246 Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1035.
247 Paul M. Anderson, Spoiling a Good Walk: Does the ADA Change The
Rules of Sport?, 1 VA. J. SPORTS & L. 44, 87 (1999).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/8
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In addition, several more compelling differences exist. The
Martin court distinguished the high school age limit cases from
Martin's situation, finding that the age limit rules were necessary
to protect younger students both in terms of safety and
competition. 24 8 The age limit rules were necessary to limit
competition, but the Martin court cited the earlier district court's
finding that Martin would gain no competitive advantage from the
use of a cart. 249 As will be discussed later, Olinger would gain no
competitive advantage from a cart, meaning that the rule would not
be necessary to protect competition and thus, distinguishable from
those in the high school cases.
Finally, Olinger is distinguishable based on the fact that
Olinger's modification was deemed to be reasonable, but the
waiver of the rule in Pottgen was deemed unreasonable. The court
in Pottgen stated, "Other than waiving the age limit, no manner,
method, or means is available which would permit Pottgen to
satisfy the age limit. Consequently, no reasonable accommodation
exists.' ,,250 On the other hand, the Olinger court affirmed the
district court's finding that Olinger's request to use a cart was a
reasonable modification. 251 The Pottgen court had a simple reason
to deny the plaintiffs request--the fact that the modification was
not reasonable. That reason was more than enough to justify the
Pottgen court's decision not to waive the rule. This difference is a
big distinguishing factor from Olinger. The fact that the
modification was deemed unreasonable might well have been the
decisive factor for the Pottgen court. To rely on a case with such a
sizable difference was a significant error on the part of the Olinger
court.

248 Martin, 204 F. 3d at 1001-2.
249 Id. at 1002 (citing Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1252).
250 Pottgen, 40 F.3d at 929.
251 Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1005.
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B. Olinger's Reliance on an Irrelevant Undue Burden
Exemption Was Erroneous
The court in Olinger again cited Sandison to advance the notion
that a requested accommodation causes a fundamental alteration if
it results in an undue burden or hardship to the public
accommodation. Olinger cited this proposition, the undue burden
exemption, stating that courts interpreting the ADA have held that
the imposition of a financial and administrative burden on an
252
entity is a sufficient reason to deny the requested modification.
The Sandison court held that requiring high school coaches to
make nearly-impossible determinations about the competitive and
hazardous effects of allowing overage athletes would impose an
undue burden on both the schools and coaches. 3 Similarly, the
Olinger court held that the administrative and financial burden of
evaluating the validity of cart requests, due to the need to develop
a system to determine whether the applicant truly requires the use
of a cart, would impose an undue hardship on the USGA.25 4
Just because the court in Olinger claimed that an undue burden
existed and was an automatic reason to deny the plaintiffs request
does not mean that this claim was valid. Olinger failed to define
either undue hardship or undue burden. One reason for this lies in
the fact that the Title III of the ADA does not provide an undue
burden exemption for public accommodations. Two possible
sources for the undue burden exemption are Title I and the
Rehabilitation Act. A recent case involving the examination of a
Title III case by a district court in the Tenth Circuit stated that the
undue burden exemption originated in Title I of the ADA
(employment discrimination) and has been incorporated into Title
III analysis. 5 In that case, the court quoted from Title I which
defined discrimination to include "not making reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of
252 Id. at 1005-6.
253 Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1035. See also McPherson v. Michigan High Sch.
Athletic Ass'n., 119 F.3d 453, 462-3 (6th Cir.1997).
254 Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1007.
255 Dahlberg v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., 92 F. Supp.2d 1091, 1105 (D. Colo.

2000).
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an otherwise qualified individual... unless [the defendant] can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose undue
hardship on.. .such... entity. ' 256 That court then used that Title I
language in its Title III analysis. Another source of the undue
burden exemption is the Rehabilitation Act. In another high school
eligibility case, the Seventh Circuit compared the applicability of
some parts of the Rehabilitation Act to the ADA, stating that a
provision of one of2the
acts could be substituted for the applicable
57
other.
the
of
portion
Assuming arguendo that the undue burden exemption is
consistent with Title III analysis, the court in Olinger erred
because the USGA would not actually experience any undue
hardship which would fundamentally alter the nature of the Open
as a result of Olinger's requested modification. The ADA's
definition of undue hardship in Title I includes four factors to
determine whether an entity would experience an undue hardship.
Even if Title III analysis in fact permits the undue hardship
exemption, an exploration of the Title I factors demonstrates that
the USGA would not experience an undue hardship as a result of
the plaintiffs requested modification. The definition of undue
hardship follows:
(A) The term "undue hardship" means an action
requiring significant difficulty or expense, when
considered in light of the factors set forth in
subparagraph (B).
(B) Factors to be considered[:] In determining
whether an accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on a covered entity, factors to be
considered include-(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation
needed under this Act;
256 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000)).
257 See Washington, 181 F.3d at 845 n.6 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating "We have
held previously that the standards applicable to one act are applicable to the
other. Title II of the ADA was modeled after § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act;
the elements of claims under the two provisions are nearly identical, and
precedent under one statute typically applies to the other.").
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(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility
or facilities involved in the provision of the
reasonable accommodation; the number of persons
employed at such facility; the effect on expenses
and resources, or the impact otherwise of such
accommodation upon the operation of the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered
entity; the overall size of the business of a covered
entity with respect to the number of its employees;
the number, type, and location of its facilities; and
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the
covered entity, including the composition, structure,
and functions of the workforce of such entity; the
geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal
relationship of the 258
facility or facilities in question to
entity.
covered
the
The first factor is the nature and cost of the requested
accommodation. Olinger's request to use a cart was reasonable and
financially insignificant to the USGA. On a larger scale, the
USGA might need to pay a few extra administrators in the future
to read the requests of applicants and determine whether those
requests were genuine. Even if this activity involved some deal of
work for the organization and necessitated the addition of
physicians to the staff, as alleged by the USGA, such an added
financial cost would not be burdensome when considering the
other three factors which relate to the USGA's size and financial
situation. The second and third factors inquire about the overall
resources of the entity, in this case, the USGA and invariably, the
PGA Tour as well. The USGA has more than 250 employees on
staff throughout the country. 9 The USGA claims to be the
responsible party for the administration of all golf-related
functions in the United States, inferring that it is a large,

258 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (2000).
259 USGA Website, Annual Report, (visited
<http://www.usga.org/about/99_annua]/index.html>.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/8
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widespread, and all-encompassing organization. 260 Similarly, the
PGA is a vast, multi-million dollar golf empire, evidenced by the
PGA's ability to pay out millions of dollars per year in awards for
successful golfers and its prestigious network television contract.
In fact, the PGA claims to be "the largest working sports
organization in the world, comprised of more than 26,000
dedicated men and women promoting the game of golf to
everyone, everywhere." 261 The final factor examines the
composition, structure, and functions of operations at the USGA.
The USGA states that it "has been expanded beyond its basic
responsibilities for making and administering the Rules of Golf,..
.[and] conducting 13 national championships. . .It now includes
major initiatives in the provision of affordable access, including
[access] for handicapped persons. 262 If the USGA does all of
these activities, it surely can handle a few additional administrative
decisions.
Based on the four factors as stated by Title I of the ADA for
determining whether an entity would endure any undue hardship,
the USGA (and arguably, the PGA) would not experience any
undue burden by modifying the no cart rule. One commentator
wrote:
The cost of a golf cart is a minimal imposition on
[the organization's] resources. In addition, the
procedural burden of reviewing claims from
disabled individuals would be less than significant,
considering the small number of individuals who
have developed abilities commensurate with
successful competition in professional golf.
Therefore, the individualized assessment of a
reasonable accommodation will create neither

260 Id.
261 PGA Website, What is the Role of the PGA ofAmerica?, (visited October
25, 2000) <http://vww.pga.com/FAQ/pgarole.html>.
262 USGA Website, Annual Report, (visited October 25, 2000)
<http://www.usga.org/about/99_annual/index.html>.
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undue financial hardships nor undue administrative
burdens.263
Compared to the overall financial resources of the USGA,
Olinger's request was insignificant. Such a request does not
constitute an undue burden on a vast association. Assuming
arguendo that Title III implicitly allows an undue hardship
exemption, that exemption must be consistent with other parts of
the Title III analysis. Title EIIrequires a fundamental alteration,
not an inconvenient alteration, to the nature of the public
accommodation, in order for the public accommodation to be able
to deny a reasonable modification. The USGA's alleged undue
hardship illustrates the opposite of what a fundamental alteration
is. The USGA's claim essentially was that Olinger's request would
be inconvenient and time-consuming. Such an endeavor is not
burdensome to the point of fundamentally altering the nature of the
Open or any of the USGA's many purported activities. The fact
that the PGA has even greater resources, compared to the USGA,
compounds the fact that a golfer's requested modification of the no
cart rule would not create an undue hardship which fundamentally
alters the nature of a public accommodation. As a result, the
Supreme Court must overrule Olinger and hold that Martin's
request neither causes an undue hardship nor is a fundamental
alteration.

C. Olinger's Finding of a Competitive Advantage Was
Erroneous
Another factor cited by the court in Olinger as the basis for
determining that the use of a cart fundamentally alters the nature of
the Open was the USGA's claim that a cart would give Olinger a
competitive advantage over other golfers. The Olinger court
affirmed the district court's finding that the use of a cart created a
263 Todd A. Hentges, Driving in the Fairway Incurs No Penalty: Martin v.
PGA Tour, Inc. and Discriminatory Boundaries in the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct, 18 LAW & INEQ. J. 131, 174-5 (2000).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/8
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competitive advantage. 264 Olinger accepted the USGA's claim that
the walking rule injected stamina and fatigue into the competition,
meaning that any attempt to waive the rule would remove those
allegedly necessary elements from the competition. 265 The court
stated that heat and humidity can affect the fatigue factor which is
a central part of the competition.266 Additionally, the court restated
the district court's finding that the point of the competition is to
determine which golfer can best accomplish the task of hitting a
golf ball under the same conditions, a great amount mental and
physical stress. 2 67 According to the court, any change to the

uniform playing conditions, such as the modification caused by the
introduction of a golf cart, might allow for a competitive
advantage for the cart user, and the consequential competitive
268
advantage would fundamentally alter the nature of the Open.
The Olinger court's theory about a competitive advantage for
Olinger resulting from his use of a cart is erroneous. Fatigue is not
a major factor in a golf tournament. Golf is a low impact activity,
not a high impact sport such as basketball or football in which
athletes experience fatigue due to the fast-paced and physicallyexhaustive activity. Golfers are allowed to walk slowly between
holes, and their caddies carry their golf clubs. Neither speed nor
strength is required to be a successful golfer.269 With neither speed
nor strength as a factor, the fatigue factor alleged by the USGA to
be a central part of competition, must be a result of the weather.
All golfers must endure the same elements; thus, the fact that a
golfer uses a cart does not make him less susceptible to heat and
264 Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1006.
265 Id. (citing Olinger, 55 F. Supp.2d at 935-6).
266 Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1006.
267 Id.
268 Id. See also Barry A. White, Lee N. Abrams, Guy G. Ward, and Walter
Driver, Jr., Brief of the United States Golf Association as Amicus Curiae in
Support ofAppellant, 1 VA. J. SPORTS & L. 110, 119 VA. J. SPORTS & L. (1999)
(stating that a professional golf tournament or national championship tests a
golfer's skill, stamina, endurance and perseverance under sometimes
unfavorable conditions).
269 See also Brian D. Shannon, Brief of the Klippel-Trenaunay Syndrome
Support Group, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellee, 1 VA. J. SPORTS & L.
93, 105 (1999) (stating that speed is not a factor in golf).
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humidity. If all golfers, those with and without a cart, are subject
to the same weather conditions, then, the use of a cart does not
provide a competitive advantage with respect to the fatigue factor.
Even with the use of a cart, the central part of the golfing
competition, shot making, is unaffected.27 0 Because Olinger and
Martin each have a debilitating disability which significantly
impairs their respective ability to walk the entire length of a golf
course, the Martin opinion will be beneficial in identifying the
fallacies of the Olinger decision. In Martin, the court held that the
central part of the competition, the shot making aspect, was
unaffected by Martin's use of a cart. 271 The game measures the
ability to put a ball into a hole, not the ability to walk from one
hole to another. 272 Why should Olinger's use of a cart cause a
different result than Martin's use?
Assuming arguendo that part of the competition in a golf
tournament is related to fatigue and that golfers who use a cart are
less susceptible to the effects of fatigue, the court in Olinger
erroneously stated that Olinger would experience less fatigue
during the course of the competition due to his use of a cart. The
fatigue, whether psychological, physiological, or physical,
experienced by Olinger and Martin, even while using a cart,
greatly exceeds the stress and fatigue experienced by an ablebodied golfer. The district court opinion in Martin stated that the
fatigue and stress endured by Martin in dealing with his disability
was much greater than any fatigue or stress experienced by a
golfer during an unseasonably hot and humid day. 273 Due to his
disability and the medication used to treat it, Olinger undoubtedly
experiences a similar level of stress and fatigue to Martin. In
addition, both Martin and Olinger still must walk more than
270 Id. (stating that the heart of the competition is shot-making).
271 Martin, 204 F.3d at 1000. See also USGA web site, 2000 Rules of Golf
and Decisions on the Rules of Golf, (visited October 25, 2000)
<http://www.usga.org/mles/rule_2000/index.html> (citing the first rule of golf,
as promulgated by the USGA stating, "The Game of Golf consists in playing a
ball from the teeing ground into the hole by a stroke or successive strokes in
accordance with the Rules.").
272 Shannon, supra note 269, at 105.
273 Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1252.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/8
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twenty-five percent of the course. For Martin, each step increases
the risk of significant injury, and for Olinger, each step brings
more intense pain. The fatigue-related conditions, some added
sweat and stress--conditions arguably endured by Martin and
Olinger also--do not remotely compare to the daily stress
experienced by the two plaintiffs. Even if fatigue is a factor, to say
that Olinger or Martin experience less fatigue while riding a cart is
a gross and inaccurate overstatement. In sum, the Supreme Court
must overrule Olinger, finding that the use of a cart in a golf
tournament does not create a competitive advantage for the cart's
user and apply that rule to the Martin appeal.

D. Olinger's Reliance on the IrrationalTradition FactorWas
Erroneous
In addition to the eligibility cases, the undue burden exemption
and the competitive advantage analysis, the Olinger court
erroneously accepted the USGA's claim that the tradition and
custom of walking in golf was an appropriate reason to hold that
any modification of that rule would fundamentally alter the nature
of the U.S. Open. The Olinger opinion specifically cited the
testimony of one of the defendant's witnesses which emphasized
the importance of the walking tradition in professional golf.274 The
Olinger court stated that the testimony emphasized "the
importance and tradition of walking in championship-level
tournament golf competition." 275 This court placed nearly as much
weight on tradition as it did for the undue burden exemption and
for the competitive advantage analysis in rationalizing its decision.
Simply put, however, tradition is an irrational reason for holding
that the use of a cart fundamentally alters the Open. The district
276
court in Martin rejected the PGA's tradition-based argument.
One commentator noted that rules promulgated and enforced for
274 Olinger,205 F.3d at 1007.
275 Id.
276 Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1250 n. 11 (stating that mere tradition is not a
cognizable purpose).
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legitimate reasons, such as the safety and competitive issues in the
high school cases, will be enforceable, but "what is not allowed
[are] nonessential rules or traditions which bar a disabled
individual from participating in golf if he . . . meets the other
criteria as established by the organization." 277 Tradition is an
unacceptable basis for upholding a rule. In the golf context,
tradition is a weak rationale for the walking rule used by the
USGA and PGA in order to cloak the lack of more rational reasons
for denying the use of a cart. Unfortunately, the Olinger court was
also blinded by the argument's cloak of inadequacy and
irrationality.
Another problem with the Olinger court's finding of tradition as
a basis for denying the plaintiffs use of a cart is that the tradition
argument has no bounds. What is the bright line for determining
what traditions are essential to golf and what traditions are not?
When is tradition just another word for laziness or an inability to
change? Who determines whether the alleged tradition is relevant
to the nature of the public accommodation?
More often than not, those individuals who hide behind tradition
are involved in using that tradition to exclude others from
becoming part of that particular tradition. Many private golf clubs
have engaged and still engage in the "tradition" of excluding
minorities from gaining membership. Obviously, this type of
tradition is forbidden by law, namely the Civil Rights Act. The use
of tradition to exclude is not just irrational; it is illegal. A brief in
support of the plaintiff in Martin stated, "Relying on tradition as a
means of upholding a discriminatory practice rings hollow. Rules
and policies based on long-standing tradition have certainly not
negated laws prohibiting discrimination based on race or gender
and cannot do so with respect to the ADA. 2 78 In the same vein,
the argument that disabled individuals will be similarly left on the
outside looking in should their key to access, the use of a golf cart,
be denied is not far-fetched.
Golf is a long and storied sport with much tradition; that cannot
be denied. What can and must be denied, however, is the use of
277 Anderson, supra note 247, at 88.
278 Shannon, supra note 269, at 108.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/8
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tradition to mask the desire to make changes which improve the
game. The use of a golf cart to provide a level playing field for
disabled athletes does not fundamentally alter the nature of a golf
tournament as stated in the above sections, and the claim that
tradition is in opposition to such a change is an irrational
argument. Golf has seen much change throughout its history, and
"tradition has not kept the game of golf from evolving in other
aspects [such as advances in clubs and balls]., 279 The use of a cart
280
is just another in the long line of advances to the game of golf.
Just like the game evolved with respect to golf balls and clubs, golf
must evolve and allow the use of carts when necessary and not
hide behind the shadows of tradition. The Supreme Court must see
through the frailties of the tradition-based argument and deny its
application in the Martin appeal.

E. Olinger's Failureto Follow the Individual Circumstances
Analysis Precedent Was Clearly Erroneous
Although the court in Olinger erroneously relied on the four
irrelevant or irrational factors stated above--all of which
demonstrate that Olinger was an incorrect decision which must be
overruled--the most appalling mistake was that the Seventh Circuit
ignored precedent in deciding Olinger on appeal. The precedent to
which the references was made is the line of cases in the Fifth,281
Seventh,28 2 and Ninth 283 Circuits which mandate that the court
must focus on the specifics of the plaintiffs situation and conduct
a highly fact-specific analysis of the plaintiffs individualized
circumstances with reference to the requested accommodation and
any possible fundamental alteration at issue. 84 The Martin court
279 Id.
280 Id.
281 See Johnson, 116 F.3d at 1059.
282 See Washington, 181 F.3d at 852.
283 See Crowder, 81 F.3d at 1486; Martin, 204 F.3d at 1001.
284 See also Dahlberg, 92 F. Supp.2d at 1105 (a case from the District of
Colorado in the Tenth Circuit which recently adopted this type of individualized
analysis).
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synthesized the rule, quoting a Fifth Circuit case from which it
borrowed the rationale. The court in Martin stated, "The issue here
is not whether the use of carts generally would fundamentally alter
the competition, but whether the use of a cart by Martin would do
so. The evidence must 'focus on the specifics of the [plaintiffs]
circumstances and
not on the general nature of the
285
accommodation.
A highly fact-specific inquiry of the individualized
circumstances of the plaintiff went largely ignored in both the
district court and appellate opinions of Olinger.The district court's
inquiry claimed to have focused on the specific effect of the
requested modification on the nature of the Open, as opposed to
the general, the game of golf.286 However, the rest of the opinion
was not tailored to follow this course of inquiry. The district court
noted a few passing references to the fact that Olinger was not like
an able-bodied golfer, but that was the extent of the discussion of
the plaintiffs individualized circumstances. 2 87 To follow the
framework advanced by Martin and its predecessors, all of which
were decided well before Olinger, the Olinger court should have
focused on the specifics of Olinger's situation and explained fully
how Olinger's use of the cart, considering all relevant information
about his background, would fundamentally alter The Open.
Unfortunately, the district court opinion reflects no evidence of
such an inquiry.
Because the USGA refused to consider the requested
modification in light of the plaintiffs unique and individualized
scenario, it "violated the proscription against discrimination by
failing to make a reasonable modification to its policies and
procedures. 288 The USGA cannot offer a "fundamental alteration
defense . . . without first looking into the circumstances
surrounding the requested modification, and [the USGA's
argument] therefore must fail for lack of foundation." 289 In
285 Martin, 204 F.3d at 1001 (quoting portions from Johnson, 116 F.3d at

1059).
286 Olinger, 55 F. Supp.2d at 934.
287 Id. at 935.
288 Hentges, supra note 263, at 174.
289 Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/8
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essence, the USGA's fundamental alteration defense was invalid
because the organization failed to follow the prescribed framework
for analysis by not considering how Olinger's use of a golf cart,
and his use alone, would fundamentally alter the nature of The
Open. By not conducting this individualized, fact-specific analysis,
the defendant USGA did not carry its burden and should not be
entitled to the fundamental alteration defense. After all, why
should the USGA be allowed the privilege of a defense which
essentially forecloses Olinger's access to The Open, punishing the
plaintiff for the defendant's failure to follow the rules set out by
precedent? In spite of the fact that the USGA failed to carry its
burden, the district court nonetheless accepted the USGA's
fundamental alteration defense.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit erroneously upheld the USGA's
defense that the plaintiffs requested modification would
fundamentally alter the nature of the Open. 9 The Seventh Circuit
gave only lip service to the precedent of several circuits, including
its own decision in Washington v. IHSAA.2 9 1 In Washington, the
Seventh Circuit examined yet another high school eligibility case,
this time, with respect to the application of an eight-semester
eligibility limit to a student-athlete with a learning disability. In
this case, the Seventh Circuit rejected the defendant's assertion of
the undue burden exemption, stating, "The few case-by-case
analyses that the IISAA would need to conduct hardly can be
described as an excessive burden." 292 In addition to rejecting the
validity of the undue burden exemption--yet another reason that
the Seventh Circuit should have rejected the exemption in Olinger-the Seventh Circuit highlighted the need to conduct a highly fact293
specific analysis of the plaintiff's individual circumstances.
The Seventh Circuit panel which decided Olinger ignored this
precedent. The court merely gave lip service to the precedent by
noting, in passing, Olinger's claim that the USGA did not offer
any evidence that allowing him to use a cart would impose any
290 Olinger, 205 F. 3d at 1007.
291 Washington, 181 F.3d at 852.
292 Id.
293 Id.
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undue hardship.294 As explained above, the district court did not
demonstrate that the USGA had in fact offered such evidence, but
the Seventh Circuit either turned a blind eye to the absence of an
individualized analysis of the circumstances or just ignored it
altogether. Whether the Seventh Circuit erred as a result of a
glaring omission or because of a conscious decision to ignore the
required consideration of the plaintiff s individualized
circumstances, the Olinger court failed to follow the principles of
stare decisis by not providing any rational reason for not following
the rule of law in the Seventh, Fifth and Ninth Circuits. By doing
so, the Olinger court very likely abused its discretion making this
erroneous decision.
Had the Seventh Circuit followed the principles of stare decisis
and conducted a proper inquiry into the plaintiffs predicament, a
good chance exists that the Supreme Court would not need to
consider the PGA's appeal of Martin. Likely, the Supreme Court
took the case because of the split between the Seventh and the
Ninth Circuits, in other words, the contradictory nature of Martin
and Olinger. If the Olinger court had followed both its circuit's
established precedent or the precedent of the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits, the case would have been decided differently. The
Olinger court should have either (1) remanded the case to the
district court to consider fully the plaintiffs use of the golf cart
and how it affected The Open or (2) made that determination on its
own. By focusing on the specifics of Olinger's use of a cart in The
Open, which neither Olinger court, in actuality, did, the Seventh
Circuit would have held similarly to the Ninth Circuit in Martin
and discounted the weight of the irrelevant factors stated above
such as eligibility, the undue burden exemption, the alleged
competitive advantage gained by using a cart, and the irrational
cloak of tradition.

294 Olinger, 205 F. 3d at 1005.
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IV. IMPACT

The impact of the Supreme Court appeal of Martin will be felt in
any of several ways. The Supreme Court will likely address the
case in one of the following methods: (1) Decide only the narrow
issue of whether Martin can use a cart on the PGA Tour, (2)
resolve the split between the circuits and determine which case,
either Martin or Olinger, is appropriate rule of law, or (3) address
the broader issue of whether the ADA applies to professional
sports. Based on the current composition of the Court and its
recent history, the Court will likely decide only what is necessary
to decide. As a result, the Court probably will not determine the
applicability of the ADA to professional sports and decide the
narrower issue of whether or not the use of a golf cart
fundamentally alters the nature of a golfing competition.

A. A Narrow Decision Will Impact Only Martin and
ProfessionalGolf
If the Court addresses only the narrower issues related to Martin,
and possibly Olinger, the impact will be noticeable, but not as
rippling as the impact of a decision on the applicability of the
ADA to all professional sports. On the more narrow issue, the
Court will decide whether the use of a cart fundamentally alters
golf competitions. The impact of this decision will be both long
term and short term. In the short term, obviously, the Court will
determine whether Martin will be able to continue using a cart on
the PGA Tour. Should the Court address the split between the
circuits, it will determine whether golfers can use a cart in the U.S.
Open, both in qualifying and tournament rounds. The short term
impact will be felt by the PGA and Martin. As the year draws to a
close, Martin's eligibility status becomes a factor. Whether he will
qualify for a spot on the PGA Tour is questionable, but he will
likely qualify to play in one of the PGA's competitive series. In
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that sense, the Court will determine whether Martin will be
allowed to use a cart on the tour next season.
Looking at the long-term effects, the PGA Tour will feel the
impact of the decision in more ways than the seemingly obvious
ones. Although the PGA seems to have ignored this fact, Martin's
presence improves the tour's value. The fact that a golfer of
Martin's caliber is allowed to compete on the PGA Tour only
helps foster competition on the tour, making it better for all
competitors. A victory over all the best golfers in the world is
much more valuable to a competitive golfer than a victory over
just some of the best golfers. Both the competitive spirit and nature
are weakened in a watered-down tour.
In addition, the Court's decision will have an impact on future
generations of Casey Martin-type figures in professional golf. The
idea that another disabled child, like Martin, with dreams of
becoming a professional golfer can look to Martin as a role model.
The application of the ADA to professional golf will help to make
sure that the dreams of those talented children who had the
misfortune of being born with a disability will not be crushed due
to either so-called tradition or blatant societal discrimination.
Because golf is a low-impact sport in which speed and strength do
not play a prominent role, golf is probably one of the only sports
where a simple modification such as the use of a cart can provide
equal access. In all likelihood, the Court will limit its decision to
professional golf because of the ease of allowing such a reasonable
modification in that particular sport. A decision in favor of Martin
will give disabled golfers to follow in Martin's footsteps. A
decision favoring the PGA will send a message to those children
saying that equality of opportunity, manifested in access to
professional golf tournaments, is not a guaranteed right for golfers
who happen to be disabled.

B. A BroadDecision Will Impact Many Areas of Professional
Sports
If the Court, however, does delve into the issue of whether the
ADA applies to professional sports, the impact will be much more
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/8
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pronounced. Since the enactment of the ADA, battles have waged
over the application of the act in particular areas. The professional
sports arena is just another battleground in a long line of
skirmishes fought by the ADA's opponents and proponents. The
ardent advocates on both sides of the fence have advanced
arguments filled with hyperbole. Proponents of the application of
the ADA to professional sports have claimed that the Supreme
Court's affirmation of Martin will highlight the important
constitutional rights of the disabled, putting the Martin decision on
par with Marbury v. Madison, Roe v. Wade, and Brown v. Board of
Education.295 Opponents claim that Congress never intended to
apply the ADA to sports296 or the slippery slope argument that the
ADA will permit alterations such as major competitive advantages
to disabled athletes such a head starts in swimming or track or
more points for a given shot in basketball than would be given to
able-bodied athletes that would change the landscape of
professional sports so much that it would be rendered
unrecognizable.
In reality, as usual, the truth is somewhere in the middle. The
application of the ADA to athletics is probably not an expansion
of the intended scope of the Act. The ADA neither explicitly
forbids its application to sports nor does it implicitly warn against
such an application. The legislators who enacted the ADA sought
merely to provide remedial legislation opening the doors of
opportunity to those millions of disabled Americans who have
faced societal discrimination because of their disability. 297 The
ADA can open the door to disabled athletes in the same way it
opened the door to disabled individuals in other fields such as
access to employment, housing, health care, public facilities, and
many other areas. In this sense, the impact of a broad decision by
the Court would be felt throughout professional sports. The ADA
limits the scope of modifications to those that are reasonable
295 Christopher M. Parent, Martin v. PGA Tour: A Misapplication of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 26 J. Legis. 123 (2000) (quoting Terence
Moore, Ruling Allowing Martin to Use Cart Disregards the Essence of Golf,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 13, 1998, at 3E).
296 Kensky, supra note 27, at 187; White, supra note 268, at 119.

297 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (2000).
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which do not fundamentally alter the nature of the sport.7 98 With
that inherent mechanism in the ADA to limit modifications, the
advocates of the chaotic slippery slope theory need not fear the
prospect of motorized wheelchairs in professional baseball games.
In a decision favoring Martin, the impact would be that disabled
athletes in other professional sports get the same type of
opportunity to fulfill their dreams just as Martin did. On the other
hand, a decision for the PGA, would signal doom for those hopes
and dreams of competing in professional sports.

V. CONCLUSION

For ten years, the ADA has improved the lives of Americans
with disabilities, providing them with access to places to which
they had been denied and protecting them from invidious
discrimination. In spite of criticism about its scope and language,
the ADA has helped to remedy discrimination against disabled
individuals just as the Civil Rights Act has aimed to remedy racial
discrimination. The ADA was not intended to be applied
selectively to some disabled individuals and not at all to others.
Just because Casey Martin happens to be a skilled professional
golfer does not make his condition any less debilitating nor should
he receive less protection than any other American who must live
with a disability. Martin did not choose to be born with a
disability. Similarly, those who oppose application of the ADA to
Martin, simply because he is a professional athlete, must realize
that the ADA does not choose to whom it will apply. The ADA
applies universally, protecting all disabled individuals in the
United States from discrimination. The remedial power granted to
the ADA by Congress mandates that a golf association such as the
PGA or the USGA must follow the law of the land and revise its
walking rule to incorporate the use of a golf cart for a disabled
individual such as Casey Martin or Ford Olinger because the use
of a cart is a reasonable accommodation which does not
fundamentally alter the nature of a professional golf tournament.
298 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/8
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As a child, Martin dreamed of a chance to compete with the
world's elite golfers. Thanks to the ADA, he continues, at the
moment, to receive his opportunity. At this point, however,
Martin's ability to use a cart is in jeopardy while the Supreme
Court prepares to hear arguments for the Martin appeal. The Court
should interpret the ADA in the light of what the legislation was
purported to do--provide access and protect the disabled from
discrimination. In making its decision, the Court must remember
why this remedial legislation is so important, embodied in a
statement by Martin who said, "Without the ADA, I never would
have been able to pursue my dream of playing golf
professionally., 299 The Court must consider the effects of the ADA
over the last ten years. Should the advances of the ADA go for
naught? Ten years from now, will the lasting image of the ADA be
a young golfer given the opportunity to compete in the sport he
loves and to fulfill his dream or will it be a victory for "The Good
Old Boys" club, denying the dreams of the disabled of future
generations in the name of tradition and discrimination? The fate
of the future of Casey Martin, the present and future of disabled
individuals, and the scope of the ADA rests in the hands of the
Supreme Court.

Brian Pollock

299 United States Department of Justice, Faces of the ADA (visited Sept. 21,
2000) <http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/fmartin.htm>.
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